The irrational Brexit and the revocability of the withdrawal notification of the United Kingdom to the European Council

Abstract:

The decision of the United Kingdom (UK) to withdraw from the European Union (EU), as this was reached, pursuant to its internal constitutional requirements, namely the referendum of 23 June 2016, the Supreme Court’s ruling which imposed the involvement of the Parliament in the internal constitutional process and finally, the decision of the British Parliament, notified to the European Council by Theresa May, has triggered the process of the Article 50 TEU and is currently underway.

The two parties representing the EU and UK are negotiating an agreement, as per Article 50 (2b and c) TEU, which will set the framework of the bilateral future relations. A major issue that has arisen, mainly in theory as well as in politics in light of Brexit, is whether a state concerned in withdrawal is allowed to revoke the notification of withdrawal from the EU to the European Council, as in the UK case.

Quite possibly, this will determine the final outcome of Brexit given that, as shown by the course of negotiations, the UK has come into a difficult position, and the post-Brexit world idealized by many Brexiters, is rather too optimistic. Reality in conjunction with the Brexiters’ intentions to extract from the EU and the rest of the Member States an agreement à la carte, with all benefits of participating in the EU, without the drawbacks, explains the strong view hereof that Brexit is irrational.

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