Political Servants or Independent Experts? A Comparative Study of Bureaucratic Role Perceptions and the Implementation of EU Law in Denmark and Sweden

Abstract:

The aim of this article is to test two hypotheses regarding bureaucratic role perceptions and the implementation of EU policies at the Member State level. A comparison of national agencies in two different executive settings, the Danish and the Swedish, yields the conclusion that established theories on bureaucratic role perceptions explain differences in policy-making in the late stage of the EU policy process. Interview data supports the first hypothesis: that the main difference between Danish and Swedish national-level bureaucrats is that between perceiving oneself as a national servant (Denmark) and as an independent expert (Sweden). The second hypothesis tested here is that national-level bureaucrats under certain circumstances will perceive themselves as EU servants, and make implementation choices accordingly. Convincing evidence supporting this hypothesis is not found — not even in the case of the food-policy agencies, which are regarded here as the most likely to foster EU servants.