Building a Stable European Deposit Insurance Scheme

Awdur (Person)	Schoenmaker, Dirk
Cyhoeddwr	Oxford University Press
Teitl y Gyfres	Journal of Financial Regulation
Manylion y Gyfres	Cyfrol 4, Rhif 2, Tudalennau 314–320
Dyddiad Cyhoeddi	September 2018
Math o Gynnwys	Journal Article
	Abstract: Deposit insurance, like any insurance scheme, raises moral hazard concerns. Such concerns arising from European deposit insurance can be alleviated through a country-specific component in the risk-based premium for deposit insurance and limits on sovereign bond exposures on bank balance sheets. This article, which forms part of the Euro Area Reform debate, argues, however, that proposals to maintain national compartments in a new European Deposit Insurance Scheme are self-defeating, as such compartments can be destabilizing in times of crisis.
Dolen Ffynhonnell	Link to Main Source https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjy004
Categorïau Pwnc	Economic and Financial Affairs
Pwnc	Banking Union, Economic and Monetary Union [EMU], Economic Governance | Situation
Allweddeiriau	Banks | Banking, European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS)
Sefydliadau Rhyngwladol	European Union [EU]