A Means to an End or an End in Itself? The EU Integrated Approach to Conflict in Mali

Abstract:

Since the unrest in Mali in 2012, the European Union (EU) has become heavily engaged in the stability of the country, where today two Common Security and Defence Policy missions and a range of EU security, development and governance tools are deployed. This commitment, combined with the deep-seated security problems in Mali, necessitates using various EU instruments coherently, particularly in light of the so-called integrated approach in the EU Global Strategy.

This paper explores how effective the EU has been in acting cohesively and strategically, taking an ‘integrated approach’ to conflict. It assesses the EU’s integrated approach in Mali through three lenses: civil-military synergies, the security-development nexus and a ‘multi-phased’ approach. It argues that meaningful synergies are being created, particularly between security and development actions.

However, amalgamating EU tools through innovations such as the Programme of support for enhanced security in the Mopti and Gao regions and for the management of border areas (PARSEC) and operational actions under Article 28 TEU has become an end in itself – a ‘laboratory of experimentation’ for the EU – rather than a means to tackle underlying instability in Mali. This is not what the integrated approach aims to achieve and there is instead a focus on implementing ad hoc programmes without a long-term plan for the future of the country, behind which all EU tools can unite. This is damaging not just for Mali but for the EU’s credibility as a global security actor.

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