Beyond the Cold War Nuclear Legacy: Offense-Defense and the Role of Nuclear Deterrence

Summary:

Since the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the defense community of the United States focused overwhelmingly on countering the threat of global terrorism.

This focus rightly reflects the danger of additional terrorist attacks against the American homeland, including conceivably even with nuclear weapons or radiological devices.

At the same time, the December, 2001 announcement of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty after the six month waiting period serves as a reminder that there still is considerable other outstanding “defense business” confronting the United States and its European allies.

In particular, it is increasingly essential to re-craft the Cold War nuclear weapons legacy, not only in its own right but because doing so can also have important payoffs for the
success of the U.S.-led global anti-terrorist campaign.

The following paper first describes some of the main features of the Cold War nuclear legacy. It then sketches a number of different schools of thought or camps that exist within the U.S. defense community in answer to the question, “what next with nuclear weaponry?”.

In light of those contending positions, it then sets out a possible way ahead – moving to recraft U.S. strategic dealings with Russia toward a non-adversarial relationship, to avoid a new Cold War with China, and to put in place the
right mix of offensive and defensive, nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to contain 21st century proliferation dangers.

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