Breaking down the EU’s defences

Date: 21/03/02

By Ilana Bet-El

IN THE summer of 2002 - possibly as early as July but more probably in September - the new EU defence entity will apparently become operable; it will take over the current NATO deployment in Macedonia.

On the ground, this milestone will probably not be noticed, since most of the troops there are already from European nations. If anything, it will be the command level that feels the change, since they will be receiving orders from a presumably different HQ in Brussels, instead of Mons (the seat of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE for short, the military HQ of NATO). But then again, maybe not.

As the political level seems to charge ahead with this endeavour, more and more questions arise. Indeed, besides untangling the problem of Turkey, Greece and access to NATO assets - which has been holding up the development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the past three years - there are very real pragmatic issues to be resolved. For example: where will the real HQ commanding the operation be? Which staff is to be used?

The 1998 St Malo Treaty states that the NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), who is always a European, will become the commander of any such operation. However, the DSACEUR is based in Mons, while the new military staff that has been created for the EU is based in Brussels.

So does that mean the DSACEUR and his staff decamp to Brussels for the duration of an EU operation, or that the EU staff move to Mons?

On the other hand, it is the new EU Political and Military Committees which will give guidance for the operations - and it is to them that the DSACEUR will presumably be answerable. How will that sit with his NATO commitment, and the NATO chain of command? How will the US deal with this dual commitment?

None of these problems are insurmountable, and will very probably be resolved, in one way or another. The operation will be mounted, a form of command established, and the ESDP declared operational. But the real question is: should it be done in this way?

The lure of the Macedonia operation is simple and probably overwhelming: it already exists, the force involved amounts to approximately 5,000 at most, and it will probably not be too dangerous. No less significantly, it can clearly be defined as peacekeeping, or if the situation deteriorates, as crisis management; and it is very clearly connected to NATO. And therein lie all the problems.

After the blatant European failures in Bosnia and subsequently Kosovo, the EU determined to improve its defence capabilities. But at the same time, the nations refused to cede even a shred of independence in these fields, which is why the Common Foreign and Security Policy - and especially all its defence aspects, including industries, research and development (R&D) and procurement - were placed firmly under Pillar Two of the EU Treaty, which demands unanimity rather than qualified majority voting, and leaves the member states to bring their policies in line with the EU rather than binds them to do so.

By so doing, the EU effectively ensured that any operation or force would be quite lame from the start, since none of the member states were bound to it.

No less, it meant that while the reason for discussing new defence capabilities in the EU was the glaring absence of any such, the need for unanimity removed any possibility of creating a proper force, since it would take only the most extreme situation to have total agreement on its use.

At the same time, since NATO was the organisation traditionally responsible for European defence, and since there was no desire on behalf of most of the EU member states to have an open rift with the US, the solution of placing the DSACEUR as commander of EU operations was evolved, as a promised tie-in between the two organisations.

However, in so doing there was an acceptance that NATO does 'real' defence, which is why the scope of any proposed EU force was effectively defined as the 'softer' capabilities of peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and crisis management - the so-called 'Petersberg Tasks'.

There is nothing wrong with Europe having a peacekeeping force that can also do humanitarian intervention and crisis management - all of which are modern terms for deploying soldiers into mostly unclear political and military situations as a measure of compassionate concern rather than clear purpose. The problem is that these capabilities do not address the needs of EU, or even European, defence and security.

If NATO is the organisation traditionally tasked with European defence, then its lack of activity - enforced by the US - since 11 September casts serious doubts on its ability, or even purpose. And the new EU force - which cannot be called an EU army since it comes under the aforementioned Pillar Two, which prohibits communality of military endeavour - with its hybrid of commands and limitations of tasks (and capabilities, which is another matter) is definitely not up to the job.

The EU, as indeed any definition of Europe, will not have a proper defence capability until the nations start talking about it - and accepting it. In other words, defence has to be moved out of Pillar Two, since it does not make any military, political or economic sense. The military problems have already been explained, while the political ones reflect largely on the waning European capabilities in light of the ever growing US ones - in NATO and all around the globe. The US may have chosen to ignore NATO as a collective partner, but it may also have been forced to do so given the poor standing of the European forces. And these will not improve as long as each nation goes at it alone. Which leads to the economic factor.

Given the declining defence budgets throughout Europe, it would be far more expedient to allow the EU to assist both defence industries and procurement from a common budget - much as the US does. Instead, due to the prohibitions of Pillar Two, each nation deals with its own or else ad hoc groupings of nations come together.

At the same time, while industry is basic to any concept of defence (they actually make the tools necessary), European defence industries are banned from getting any assistance from the EU, other than as aerospace industries.

It is a difficult concept for the member states to swallow, but it is time to accept that defence is a Community issue.

Eventually that could mean all aspects - but eventually is a long way away, and Europe needs some help now. So perhaps a small step could be the removal of defence procurement and R&D from Pillar Two to the more flexible Pillar One. That way, when eventually finally arrives, the EU may actually be prepared and have the tools for a credible force. If not, we will perpetually be asking the most basic question: what is the EU defence capability?

Dr Ilana Bet-El is a former senior advisor on the Balkans in the UN Department of Political Affairs. She now handles international defence and political strategy issues at GPC International Public Affairs and Communications in Brussels.