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Abstract
This book presents an institutional theory for career behaviour in the European Parliament (EP). By focusing on the professional ambition of members of the EP (MEPs), the study presents a rigorous analysis of the powerful multinational legislature from within—problematizing the link between institutional change and individual action, as evidenced in the career paths taken by MEPs. The dependent variable of the book—MEP career behaviour—is addressed in three different ways: (1) the incidence of MEPs who develop extended careers at the European level; (2) the incidence of MEPs who use their time in the EP in order to promote a broader career path elsewhere; and (3) the strategies used by MEPs to advance internally within the EP’s unique committee system. The book uses a major new source of quantitative data collected on the personal and professional backgrounds of all MEPs, 1979–2014. It also relies on extensive qualitative data, taken from over fifty interviews with legislators and other elites in Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Poland. The study has implications for the nexus of institutional change and the behaviour of the political elite, broadly, as well as the study of representative democracy in the EU, specifically. It should be seen as an important contribution to the fields of legislative studies, political sociology, and party politics.
Table of Contents
1 Career Ambition in the European Parliament
2 An Institutional Theory for MEP Career Behaviour
3 Professionalization, Power, and Ambition
4 Federalism and Party Gatekeeping
5 Rapporteur Selection and Internal Advancement
6 French MEPs and the Effect of High Turnover
7 German MEPs and the Benefits of Seniority
8 Poland and the Future Face of the EP
9 Towards a Broader Appreciation for Political Careers
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