Compliance with cartel laws and the determinants of deterrence – an empirical investigation

Author (Person) ,
Publisher
Series Title
Series Details Volume 13, Number 2-3, Pages 336-355
Publication Date June 2017
ISSN 1744-1056
Content Type

Abstract:

This paper empirically investigates the drivers of compliance to cartel law and deterrence properties of enforcement tools with conjoint firm-level online survey data from the Netherlands. Compliance is measured by a response to varying hypothetical cartel scenarios. Respondents were asked to indicate the likelihood on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) that they would end a cartel that they discovered within their organization. The personal fine for the manager and the fine for the company have a statistically significant deterrent effect. Firm size, publicity following an infringement and the leniency program have no significant effect on compliance. For the most deterring scenario, the probability of a fully compliant outcome (defined as likelihood equal to 10) is estimated at .68. Self-reported knowledge of cartel law, having a compliance officer and the habit to consult a lawyer on competition law matters are statistically significant drivers of compliance.

Source Link https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2017.1387450
Subject Categories
Subject Tags
Keywords