Doorkeepers and gatecrashers: EU enlargement and negotiation strategies

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Series Details Vol.26, No.1, March 2004, p3-23
Publication Date March 2004
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Article abstract:

This paper discusses the eastward enlargement process of the EU in the framework of a simple 'war of attrition' bargaining game. Both players - the existing EU members and the applicants - benefit from enlargement, yet for the applicants, reform to the acquis is costly, while the EU prefers substantially reformed candidates. A waiting game unfolds. Within this framework the present enlargement round is analysed and policy results are deduced. For example, it is shown that delegating the evaluation of applicants to a third party, compensating applicants for their reform efforts or increasing the benefits for new members are all effective negotiation strategies for the EU that have been applied in the process.

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