End to old rivalries demands defence rethink

Date: 14/01/1999

A ground-breaking initiative which would change the face of defence politics by ending the status quo of reliance on nuclear deterrents won the support of more than 100 countries last month. Sharon Riggle argues that it deserves the support of every country serious about a secure post-Cold War environment and says NATO's European members have a unique chance to influence the debate

IN June last year, a diverse group of eight countries (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden) launched an initiative aimed at changing the face of security politics forever.

This group of countries, known as the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), has developed a programme for the future of nuclear disarmament which directly challenges the status quo of reliance on a nuclear deterrent as a legitimate means of defence and is intended to help break the current deadlock in disarmament talks.

Thirty-four countries took up this matter in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by sponsoring a resolution supporting the measures in the June statement 'Towards a nuclear-weapons-free world: the need for a new agenda'.

When this was voted on at the beginning of last month, 114 nations supported it and only 18 voted against. Of the EU member states, only the UK and France went along with the Americans in opposing it.

The issue has caused a stir in the Union, with governments divided over the move, as well as within NATO, whose members came under intense pressure from the US to vote 'no'.

There was support in the European Parliament for the resolution supporting the efforts at the UN, and the aims of the NAC in general, which states: "The international community must not enter the third millennium with the prospect that the possession of nuclear weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future. The present juncture provides a unique opportunity to proceed to prohibit and eradicate them for all time."

It is clear that several EU countries support the aims of the initiative and the United Nations resolution, as do thousands of citizens' organisations globally. The resolution embodies several important concepts: support for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, taking nuclear arsenals off hair-trigger alert, support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty, a call for all states to rethink strategic doctrines and reliance on nuclear deterrence, control of fissile materials and others.

A relic of the Cold War, NATO is desperately clinging to the old way of thinking and has been frantically searching for a new raison d'être for almost a decade.

The US still dominates in decision-making and influence, but may not be able to hold on to that power indefinitely. The NAC resolution in the UN has certainly taken a bit of swagger out of its step.

All three nuclear states in NATO desperately sent arm-twisting delegations around to their European 'friends' in the run-up to the vote to try to ensure that no NATO member supported the resolution. Their nervousness over this new measure signified a break with the past, when there was never any question that all members voted en bloc on important nuclear matters.

NATO is still regarded as the primary security/defence organisation for Europe. Indeed, the clause in the Amsterdam Treaty which mentions a 'common defence' goes on to state that whatever is decided will in no way clash or compete with the organisation's policy. It is this outmoded mentality that impedes Europe from developing a sane, modern co-operative security architecture.

If this NAC receives the support of some NATO members, what are the implications of a split in the defence organisation? It would certainly be a signal to the institution that times have changed and so must old thinking.

There is not a consensus within the alliance on the nuclear question, but most probably NATO will not renounce its nuclear deterrence posture in its new 'strategic concept'. Why? The US voice is the loudest and most dominant in not only keeping the nuclear destructive capability it currently has, but finding new ways in which to use it via counter-proliferation.

This reality of power politics is the source of much frustration in Europe and abroad.

That frustration is reflected constantly in multilateral fora such as the UN and the Conference on Disarmament. Nations around the world are eager to see a future free from the threat of nuclear destruction. Indeed, the declared nuclear-weapon states (UK, France, US, Russia, China) committed themselves to disarm 30 years ago in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Yet even the mildest of proposed measures meets with strong and vociferous opposition from a dwindling number of countries either protecting their own weapons or still living in the Cold War era.

The EU remained publicly silent about the NAC and its UN resolution. Of the 15 Union member states, two are founders of the coalition, and two are nuclear powers and members of NATO - a situation which causes innumerable problems in forging common policy.

A representative of the Austrian presidency was questioned in the European Parliament's foreign affairs committee about the EU position in the autumn, and could give no response. This issue has also been a test of Union cohesion, with member states standing in opposing camps.

Nuclear questions have always been tricky to deal with in common positions and joint actions. The wording has often been weak and the content uninspiring. Will a future Mr/Mrs CFSP be able to tackle the challenge of co-ordinating a coherent EU policy on nuclear weapons? Almost certainly not.

One of the biggest challenges to a future strengthened CFSP will be how to deal with the nuclear issue. It most likely will be left until last, with other, easier questions tackled first. This means that current confrontations will be typical in the EU setting well into the future.

The Amsterdam Treaty does not set a much clearer path regarding a future common defence. It states that the EU will "implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence", and "closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union".

Perhaps. But this convergence will be a very long time in coming, if at all. There are certainly influential elements in the EU which will not agree to such a merger any time in the foreseeable future.

This NAC 'coalition of the willing', and others like it, will continue to become more common as former blocs and alliances dissolve or evolve. The days of an East-West superpower struggle are over. Nations are reassessing their security needs and are finding that a broader definition of 'security' is required in this new era. It is not surprising, therefore, that European countries are now looking beyond their regional borders for answers to these questions.

NATO has a pivotal role to play in this new paradigm. A key will be, first, to remove remaining US nuclear warheads from European soil and, second, to make the organisation non-nuclear.

EU members have a unique chance to influence this as NATO reviews its strategic concept in the coming months. The nuclear paragraphs could be altered or deleted, but at the very least a more robust public debate is needed before governments act on behalf of their citizens.

The NAC resolution deserves the support of every country serious about a secure post-Cold War environment. Europe has a key role to play in moving this initiative forward.

NATO strong-arm tactics, led by the US, are inappropriate in the extreme and underline the need for new or revamped security structures. These coercive methods also illustrate a reaction to the gradual loss of power the nuclear-weapon states are experiencing as their arsenals are delegitimised in the eyes of the world.

The East-West rivalry is finished and it is time to rethink defence politics, and move steadily and determinedly down the road to nuclear disarmament.

The NAC has set a new track for this, which at the very least should stimulate long-overdue debate on this vital question. If a real, functioning CFSP is ever to emerge, then this question must be dealt with.

Sharon Riggle is acting director of the Centre for European Security and Disarmament (CESD), Brussels, a non-governmental research organisation which specialises in European foreign and security policy, UN and NATO issues. It focuses on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in particular.

Major feature. Author is acting director of the Centre for European Security and Disarmament (CESD).