Last chance saloon: Open letter to the Convention

Date: 12/06/03

By Stanley Crossick

Dear Member TODAY, 12 June, you meet in plenary session, perhaps for the last time. The eyes of all those concerned for Europe's future will be upon you.

The Convention has surprised many. When it was launched by the European Council at Laeken in December 2001, the possibility that a constitution could be one result of its work was a fantasy, as was a single comprehensive treaty.

The Convention's half-term report was excellent: there were high hopes of achieving a consensus. These hopes faded badly during the last month but a great effort has been made during the final few days to achieve a compromise which is both ambitious and consistent.

But it cannot be the case that 'any compromise will do'. Whatever the Convention agrees must both strengthen the European Union's effectiveness and make its institutions more democratic, transparent and accountable.

Clearly, forum members do not wish to see 15 months' hard work wasted. Failure to reach consensus will threaten the very fabric of the EU.

The Union would be incapable of operating in the efficient and democratic manner necessary to face its internal and external challenges, including enlargement.

The Convention's influence on the growth of participatory democracy in the EU would be lost.

Our citizens would be encouraged to give up on Europe at the very time they believe in the need for common foreign, security and defence policies.

Achieving a consensus will require from all members, and the interests they represent, a mutual willingness, a spirit of solidarity and political courage. The final negotiations must not be approached as a zero-sum game.

Notwithstanding serious objections to a long-term chairmanship of the European Council, its acceptance is the only way to achieve a worthwhile compromise; one which will be more forward-looking than can be expected from the intergovernmental conference.

• believe that a fair compromise on the institutional provisions is achievable, if it is based on the following:
  • A carefully circumscribed "non-executive" chairmanship of the European Council;
  • a better input of the European Parliament in the choice of the Commission president, through an election, possibly on a list of candidates presented by the European Council;
  • the Commission to be comprised of nationals of all member states, but with a limit on the number of voting commissioners and with a system of equal rotation;
  • the legislative and executive Councils to be separate - the suggested merging of the General Affairs Council (GAC) and the Legislative Council, meeting in different compositions, is an improvement on the current situation but not an ideal solution;
  • the Commission to play a key part in preparing the meetings of the GAC;
  • the Commission and the GAC to be responsible for the preparation of, and follow-up to, the European Council meetings;
  • the EU Foreign Minister to be a Commission vice-president and to chair the Foreign Affairs Council, and;
  • other Councils to be chaired by rotation.

Provided that there is a consensus on a consistent institutional package, it would be reasonable for the Convention to continue its work for a while longer, so as to avoid a repetition of the Nice experience, when minimal reforms were declared to clear the way for enlargement.

The essential concern is that, however important the institutional provisions may be, the removal, wherever possible, of the national veto is even more important. The threat of paralysis will be very real in an enlarged EU. To face it, we need:

• Qualified majority voting (QMV) to be decided by a formula based on a simple majority of the member states and a percentage of the underlying population (ideally 50). A transition period would not be unreasonable;
• QMV (sometimes a super-QMV, based on a majority of the member states and, say, 80 of the population) to be generalized in Council, with only a limited number of exceptions. QMV for common foreign and security policy to be reinstated;
• a provision enabling the Council, preferably by super-QMV, to extend QMV to provisions requiring unanimity, and, finally;
• all or most of the provisions of Part III of the treaty to be amendable without national ratification and, through a Council decision requiring less than unanimity (eg a 'double 80').

The Iraq crisis has no doubt contributed to the loss of solidarity between member states. However, it would be ironic if Europe, already divided over Iraq, should fail at the time when it needs to show that respect for the rule of law, multilateralism and pooled sovereignty is the only way to achieve a system of lasting global governance.

In spite of the present troubled context, the Convention can - and must - provide guidance to public opinion.

The Nice negotiations were a failure because member states constantly invoked their national interest and completely forgot their common interest, which is much more important.

The Convention will deserve its place in history if it corrects this fundamental mistake. The community system has served all member states, big and small, well for over a half century and must be preserved.

• therefore appeal to the forum to recognise the common interest at stake.

Failure must not be an option.

• Stanley Crossick is director and founding chairman of the Brussels-based European Policy Centre.

Letter from Stanley Crossick, director and founding chairman of the European Policy Centre, Brussels.

http://www.epc.eu/ http://www.epc.eu/

---