Norway relegated to sidelines after rejecting EU membership

Series Title
Series Details 16/11/95, Volume 1, Number 09
Publication Date 16/11/1995
Content Type

Date: 16/11/1995

One year after the Norwegian No vote, Ole Ryborg reports on how the referendum has affected the country's relations with Europe.

THE nature of the work done by Brussels-based Norwegian diplomats has changed markedly since their country rejected EU membership 12 months ago.

For half a year between the end of negotiations on its membership application and the 28 November referendum last year, Norway was on the inside track on the Union's decision-making process.

But once the votes had been counted in a poll which produced a relatively narrow 'No' to EU membership - by 52.5&percent; to 47.5&percent; - the impact was immediate.

On the morning after the referendum, the Norway sign was removed from all the negotiating tables in the Council of Ministers building and Norwegian ministers and diplomats had to adjust to a new relationship with the Union - switching from the inside track to a new role as lobbyists trying to influence the debate from the outside.

Among around 30 different national representations of countries outside the EU with a base in Brussels, those in the Norwegian offices on Rue Archimède are without doubt under the most intense pressure to produce results.

That pressure stems from the existence of the agreement between the Union and member countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) - Norway and Iceland - which established the European Economic Area (EEA).

The EEA is now the only official link between EU and Norway in the wake of the country's rejection of the offer of membership.

That agreement effectively makes Norway and Iceland fully-fledged participants in the single market except in the areas of agriculture and fish and, as part of the agreement, Norway is obliged to transpose all EU legislation on single market matters into national law.

This gives Norway a very direct interest in influencing proposals for new EU legislation, on the single market in particular, to the best of its ability.

On the last Friday of every month, there are meetings of the joint EU-EFTA body where forthcoming proposals for new EU laws are discussed. This is the main forum available to Norwegian diplomats trying to influence EU law-making since voters back home rejected the full-blooded participation in the decision-making process membership would have brought.

The Union is not, however, obliged to take account of the Norwegian point of view on proposed legislation when reaching its decisions, as the joint EU-EFTA body has the right only to be consulted.

So there is no guarantee that EU member states will consider the Norwegian standpoint on important single market legislation such as, for example, the proposal for new rules governing television advertisements involving minors. Yet the Norwegian government is obliged to incorporate whatever rules are adopted by the 15 member states into its national laws.

Norwegian diplomats acknowledge that this is by no means an ideal position for the country to be in. But considering that the only alternative would be a traditional free trade agreement between the EU and Norway, they regard the EEA agreement as the best of the various bad alternatives Norway was left with after last November's 'No' vote. The EEA agreement at least allows businesses to invest in Norway while at the same time having free access to the EU market, whereas a free trade agreement would not.

Diplomats also believe they do get a fair hearing when they raise concerns about particular pieces of legislation. One senior Norwegian diplomat commented: “The EU representatives in the joint EEA committee are professional and serious people who listen to our concerns.”

However, officials admit that the consultation procedure is not enough and that they have to lobby hard on specific issues as well.

The consultation procedure is based on the European Commission's proposals for legislation and Norway has no official access to the documents on which negotiations in the Council of Ministers are based. This means that its diplomats risk being left in the dark about how talks in the Council are proceeding, unless they employ the lobbyists' tactic of using direct contacts with EU diplomats to get more information about the state of play in the negotiations.

Norway has also faced problems because, until recently, the declarations attached to Council documents (stating, for example, how the Commission would administer an adopted EU directive) were kept secret, making it harder for the Norwegians to understand precisely what had been agreed and therefore more difficult to implement it in national law.

Besides the much tougher task Norwegian diplomats now face in influencing the making of EU legislation, they have also discovered that it has become harder to influence Union decisions in the area of the common foreign and security policy.

A protocol to the EEA agreement states that the EU and EFTA countries should have close contacts in this area and, in the months since the Norwegian No vote to membership, the country's government has been working hard to turn this into a political reality.

But Oslo has found itself in a difficult and embarrassing position as the EU develops closer contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to lay the ground for their future membership of the Union. Norway enjoys none of the special privileges extended to governments of the CEECs: invitations to heads of state and ministers to EU summits, regular dialogue meetings between EU ministers and their counterparts from the east and working group meetings of officials.

While would-be future members bask in all this attention, Norway is left out in the cold, despite having come so close to joining the EU's ranks.

Oslo has tried to compensate for this by signing up to some of the foreign policy declarations made by EU foreign ministers and has also been promised regular meetings between the Union and Norway on foreign policy issues.

As a contributor to the peacekeeping effort in former Yugoslavia - Norway has around 1,000 soldiers on the ground - the Norwegian government is in close contact with the EU when that issue is debated.

But in other foreign policy areas, the country is left on the sidelines as the Union develops its approach.

Oslo is now exploring ways of being involved in the Schengen agreement along with other Nordic countries, a move which would mean the end of border controls. Negotiations on this are proceeding under the guidance of Belgium, current president of the Schengen executive committee.

But in other matters relating to the internal security of Europe, Norway once again finds itself on the outside - with very little cooperation between Oslo and the EU in areas such as the work of the fledging criminal intelligence agency Europol.

One year after the referendum, the Norwegian policy on Europe could be characterised as a determination to “get the best out of it”. After voters rejected the idea of full membership, it has to walk a tightrope as it tries to remain as close to the Union as possible without arousing the anger of those who fought so hard to keep their country out of it.

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