Peer selection in EU intergovernmental negotiations

Abstract: This paper presents the peer co-ordination approach to EU intergovernmental negotiations. This approach seeks to contribute to liberal intergovernmentalist' bargaining theory (Moravcsik 1993, 1998). It assumes that EU intergovernmental negotiations should be conceptualized as a rational learning process under uncertainty in which governments co-ordinate with peers in intergovernmental policy networks. In particular, the artcile investigates the reasons why an EU government should select another government as a peer. Relying on a dataset on the EU Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 which led to the Amsterdam Treaty, it tests five alternative hypotheses on peer selection (ex ante transnational co-ordination, preference, salience, power, and neighbourship; H1-H5). A random model provides a null model (H0) against which to test alternative models. Peer selection during these EU intergovernmental negotiations can best be explained by ex ante transnational co-ordination networks.