| Author (Person) | Libicki, Martin C. |
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| Publisher | Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) |
| Series Title | ISPI Analysis |
| Series Details | No.202, October 2013 |
| Publication Date | 31/10/2013 |
| Content Type | Journal | Series | Blog |
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Abstract Can the United States rely on cyber-deterrence – the threat to retaliate in kind if attacked in cyberspace in very damaging ways? The difficulties in attribution were thought decisive until DoD leaders argued that attribution was actually good. Perhaps the attribution of those who repeatedly penetrate systems, haul away copious information, and fear no consequences (e.g., Chinese hackers) is good (it never gets tested). But attribution for cyberwarriors who need only penetrate once, need not haul away large amounts of information, and may well bear consequences is a different thing entirely. The paper also moots how deterrence measures may be applied to stop Chinese hacking when their activity (espionage) is sanctioned by international norms and carried out by other countries (albeit for different reasons), and where the harm done is hard to quantify. |
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| Source Link | http://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazioni |
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| Subject Categories | Business and Industry, Security and Defence |
| Countries / Regions | Europe |
