|Author (Person)||Leino, Päivi, Saarenheimo, Tuomas|
|Publisher||Sweet and Maxwell|
|Series Title||European Law Review|
|Series Details||Volume 42, Number 2, Pages 166-189|
|Publication Date||April 2017|
|Content Type||Journal Article|
Successive European Monetary Union (EMU) roadmaps have presented the expansion of EU controls over Member States’ economic policies as an integral part of monetary union, vital to its survival. Possible alternatives have hardly been discussed.
In this contribution, we trace the evolution of the EU economic policy co-ordination framework from a relatively narrow, rules-based exercise into a largely discretionary process that reaches even the most politically salient areas of the Member States’ economic policies. We then discuss how the extensive coercive powers that the EU formally possesses have turned out to be difficult to use in practice. This reflects the fundamental limits of the EU’s legitimate use of power over its Member States, set by its current level of political and cultural integration. To have a chance of success, further designs of EMU need to respect these limits.
|Subject Categories||Economic and Financial Affairs|
|Subject Tags||Economic and Monetary Union [EMU], Economic Governance | Situation|
|International Organisations||European Union [EU]|