|Author (Person)||van Damme, Eric, Zhou, Jun|
|Series Title||Bruegel Working Papers|
|Series Details||No.02, February 2016|
|Publication Date||February 2016|
|Content Type||Journal | Series | Blog|
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The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014.
The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated, but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market also engaged in collusion. The revision of the Commission’s leniency programme in 2002 increased the rate of pre-investigation applications. Our results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of conspiracy.
|Subject Categories||Internal Markets|
|Countries / Regions||Europe|