The EU controls FIFA and UEFA: a principal–agent perspective

Abstract:

This article demonstrates that the European Union (EU) can curtail the autonomy of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) by building upon insights from the principal-agent model. It explores and explains the EU's control over these organizations by mapping the actors and instruments that define EU control of FIFA and UEFA and discussing their activation and mitigation. In this light, it introduces a new perspective (exogenous control) and instrument (steering). Whether or not the EU deploys the control instruments at its disposal is defined by a constant interplay between FIFA and UEFA, their political and football principals and their EU supervisors. Activating and mitigating control within this triangular set-up will dictate whether or not FIFA and UEFA can expect their autonomy to be curtailed if and when they break from good governance practices.

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