The GE/Honeywell Judgment and the Assessment of Conglomerate Effects: What’s New in EC Practice?

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Series Details Volume 2, Number 1, Pages 141-167
Publication Date January 2006
ISSN 1744-1056
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Introduction:

"In December 2005, the Court of First Instance (CFI) finally delivered the long-awaited judgment in General Electric v Commission, a little over 4 years after General Electric (GE) lodged its appeal against the decision of the European Commission prohibiting GE’s planned merger with Honeywell International, Inc. The Commission’s decision—the source of an antitrust rift between the Commission and the US antitrust agencies—identified horizontal, vertical and, controversially, conglomerate concerns. The CFI severely criticised the Commission’s analysis of the vertical and conglomerate effects of the merger. However, the CFI dismissed GE’s appeal, holding that the alleged horizontal effects identified by the Commission, which the CFI considered the merging parties failed to address through adequate remedial action, were “sufficient” to justify the Commission’s prohibition decision."
"This article discusses the CFI’s analysis of the Commission’s theory of conglomerate harm in GE/Honeywell, and considers the extent to which the CFI judgment sheds any new or additional light on the Commission’s practice in relation to conglomerate mergers. In addition, the article discusses recent developments since the Tetra Laval judgments with respect to conglomerate mergers under EC merger control. The article concludes by suggesting possible policy orientations that the Commission might follow in its treatment of conglomerate mergers."
Source Link https://doi.org/10.5235/ecj.v2n1.141
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