The international bargaining power of the European Union in ‘mixed’ competence negotiations: the case of the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

Abstract:

Studies of the European Union's role in international policy negotiations typically focus either on trade agreements, where the Community often enjoys exclusive competence in negotiations, or on military and security accords, where Member States take the diplomatic lead in international talks. Between these extremes are a number of issue negotiations in which Community officials and Member State representatives speak jointly on behalf of the EU. We analyse one such 'mixed competence' case - the negotiations for a global biosafety protocol - to understand more about the EU's behaviour and bargaining power in such settings. We aim for explanatory parsimony by applying an existing model designed to predict EU bargaining power in international trade negotiations (Meunier, 2000). The analysis reveals that the trade model has considerable explanatory power for some of the outcomes found in the biosafety protocol negotiations, but incorrectly predicts that the EU will have no bargaining power. We then explore the sources of discrepancy between the model's predictions and our empirical results, thereby identifying some of the general differences between exclusive and mixed competence negotiations. We conclude by making suggestions for future model-building and by reflecting on some recent proposed changes that may affect the EU's bargaining power on the global stage.

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