The principle of legal certainty in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: from certainty to trust

Publishers Abstract
This article explains incoherencies in the Court’s judgments regarding the principle of legal certainty by reference to the history of legal ideas. Indeed, four "logics" that animate this principle (as defined by the Court) have been building up from antiquity to the present day, with a significant turn in the 17th century. Two of these logics propose alternative bases for the principle: the Cartesian logic is grounded in the requirement for (absolute) certainty while the fiduciary logic is built on the notion of trust.

The two remaining logics are related to the potential beneficiaries of legal certainty: the subjects of law (subjective logic) or the Prince (political logic). The author concludes with two proposals: first, to replace the (unrealistic) Cartesian logic as a basis for legal certainty with the fiduciary logic, and secondly, to activate the principle of legal certainty in favour of individuals and not the EU.

• Primary Source

Sweet and Maxwell: European Law Review http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/catalogue/productdetails.aspx?recordid=427&productid=6968

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