The Spanish Presidency of 2002 and the European Union’s Eastern Enlargement: a Lesson on the Potentials and Limits of EU Presidencies

There are two possible ways of looking at the Spanish Presidency and Eastern enlargement. One can approach it from the perspective of EU enlargement policy and, hence, evaluate what has been the impact of the Presidency on enlargement negotiations and the enlargement process. But one can also see it from the more general angle of how do Presidencies perform and what are their potentials, limits and possibilities. Focusing only on the results of Presidency, it is evident that the Presidency failed to obtain a common position on the most decisive issues of enlargement negotiations and that, as a result, the 2004 enlargement deadline was put in danger. In contrast, focusing on the performance of Presidency, we can easily conclude that, contrary to the expectations, when it came to the management of the enlargement dossier, Spain performed rather well both as Presidency and as a Member State. Obviously, explaining why good performance did not translate into good results deserves a detailed analysis.

Despite the positive evaluation of the Presidency which President Aznar presented to the European Parliament on 2 July 2002, the failure of the Fifteen to reach a common position on the agricultural and budgetary chapters of enlargement negotiations during the semester of the Spanish Presidency can be seen as one of the most outstanding outcomes of the Spanish Presidency. The result of this failure is that the Fifteen failed to meet the road map agreed upon in Götemburg in June 2001 and put enlargement at risk

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