The Takeover Bids Directive: An Opportunity for Europe or Simply a Compromise?

Summary:

This article assesses whether the framework of the takeover bids Directive corresponds to substantial uniformity across Europe, or is rendered vain by the flexibility granted by the Directive itself. The analysis of the paper is aimed at assessing to what extent the non-frustrating rules hinder or enhance the goals stated by the Directive.

The  first part of the article introduces the European Commission’s working paper, which is mainly focused on how Member States changed the board neutrality rule and the breakthrough rule. The following parts describe the central provisions of the Directive and examine the goals of the Directive. The last part analyses some of the problems arising in the concrete application of the Directive. The conclusion, argues that the theoretical model implied by the Directive can actually induce the optimum transposition where Member States and companies find incentives to apply the rules on defences against takeover provided by the European law.

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