Trawling for subsidies: the alignment of incentives between fishermen and marine biologists

Abstract: In the fishing industry, fishermen traditionally have incentives to signal too many fish in the sea in order to have access to a high short-term catch level and subsidies, whereas marine biologists have incentives to signal too few fish in the sea. Marine biologists have an incentive to maximize their budgets both for altruistic reasons (to restore fish stocks) and for private reasons (by increasing demand for their services). This article analyses the outcome of a game where the biologists and the fishermen are informed about the true stock size while the decision-maker is not. Its model shows that interest groups, traditionally perceived as opponents, may have mutual interests. Solving the current deadlocks in the EU fishery negotiations highlights the need to reveal the true incentives that motivate stakeholders, such as the symbiosis and alignment of interests identified here.

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