Verifying and demonstrating compliance with the BTWC

Summary:

Almost 40 years after it came into being in 1972, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention remains without a proper verification mechanism. The decade after the collapse of negotiations on a verification protocol for the BTWC in 2001 went by without discussions on the issue, but recently states have again voiced their support for verification procedures and civil society organizations have touched on the subject. Discussions on BTWC verification need to accept two basic premises: verifying compliance with the BTWC is about determining whether or not states are using their life science capabilities to build biological weapons and does not relate to any of the many other obligations in the biological weapon control regime; and verification cannot be expected to provide ‘yes or no’ answers to compliance questions. Instead, a functioning verification mechanism for the BTWC will enable moving from little towards more confidence in compliance in relation to an increasing number of states. Three elements are central to BTWC verification: an information-monitoring capacity, challenge investigations and consultation procedures to address ambiguities and low-level compliance concerns. These three elements already exist in draft form, in the confidence-building measures, the United Nations Secretary General’s investigation mechanism and the consultative mechanism under Article V of the BTWC. All three elements need to be revised and clarified.

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