When crisis flies in will we cope?

The arrival of avian flu on Europe's borders demands creative reflection on the part of EU officials. Avian flu is a perfect example of a transnational threat made worse by globalisation and the lowering of barriers: it threatens sectors far beyond animal health and casts a spotlight onto the capabilities of government authorities. For these reasons, the EU will be implicated in the crisis whether by choice or not. Is it ready?

Plans are in place for avian flu, but such plans are not practised, too generic, without specific prescriptions and geared towards the medium-term phase of an outbreak.

If multiple locations in the EU discover bird flu over the next weeks, too many questions will have been left unanswered. Neglect of these questions may lead to confusion, which in turn may lead to conflicting messages from officials, to public worry, and to reluctance from private industry to invest in a response.

Plans are limited to a single sector. An outbreak of avian flu anywhere in the EU would stop travel, hamper or just paralyse trade, hit capital markets, overcrowd hospitals and cripple public services.

The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates 25% of workers would stay at home in the event of an outbreak: just imagine the impact of such widespread absenteeism. Other sectors and directorate-generals (DGs) in the Commission (single market, environment, social policy, transport, just to name a few) need to plan now for dealing with the cascading effects of an outbreak.

EU efforts to integrate crisis management structures are too slow. What systems will be put in place to deal with such particular crises? Will counter-terrorism response initiatives be used to deal with domestic emergencies like bird flu, which may end up killing as many people? What is the progress on ARGUS, the central network of dedicated crisis centres set up in late 2004 inside the Commission? As always, fragmentation presents a major hurdle to communication and cooperation within the institutions.

Solutions are difficult to come by. There are no easy answers. Yet several initiatives could be considered immediately by European officials in the short to medium term.

It is vital to develop decision scenarios for different avian flu developments and seek scientific committee advice on each scenario. But will vaccination or culling be recommended? How will the Commission respond to the closure of borders and trade? How will announcements from national capitals be reconciled with Commission prerogatives and international experts' advice? Lessons should be learnt from the 'mad cow' crisis.

Consider the type of decision forum best suited for dealing with the arrival of bird flu. Who will participate? Have the potential main players already come together to (at the very least) familiarise themselves? How will the huge number of actors seeking input be reconciled with the need to make quick decisions? How will the Commission communicate with national officials to present a unified front? Such questions must be answered as soon as possible.

In the medium term, we need to revisit ideas for an integrated crisis management structure that brings key players together from the Commission and the Council. Current proposals may not be perfect, yet we need ongoing thinking about how strategic decisions can be drawn together with operat- ional capacities.

The cascading effect of future crises will demand that all Commission DGs take a role in monitoring, preparing for, and responding to such crises. Interoperability and an all-hazards approach should top the agenda.

In the longer term, we must create a stand-ing advisory group in which epidemiologists, Commission officials, crisis experts and other key actors can oversee planning efforts, supervise exercises, and offer future recommendations. Crisis contingency planning must be part of the everyday thinking of EU institution officials.

European citizens increasingly look toward the EU for safety and security from different threats: terrorism, drug and human trafficking along our borders, pandemics, fires and floods. This is not only for objective reasons, ie the cross-border nature of risks and threats and their impact. This also stems from declarations in Brussels that the EU "must do more".

It is raising expectations and failing to act quickly and effectively might further corrode public trust in EU institutions. On the other hand, good crisis management can rebuild confidence and help repair trust.

Perhaps more attention to crisis management should be one outcome of the 'period of reflection' on the future of Europe.

• Antonio Missiroli is chief policy analyst at the European Policy Centre and Mark Rhinard is a senior researcher at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. The EPC, together with the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, is creating a task force on Managing Emergencies: the role of the EU in security and safety.

Major analysis feature in which the authors, who are chief policy analyst at the European Policy Centre and senior researcher at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs respectively ask the question whether the European Union was prepared for a major outbreak of avian flu in one or several of its Member States.

• Primary Source

European Commission: DG External Relations: European Union in the World: Avian influenza http://ec.europa.eu/comm/world/avian_influenza/index.htm

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