Will Norway come in from the cold?

Date: 28/03/02

Michael Emerson and Marius Vahl of the Centre for European Policy Studies examine the pros and cons of Norway's status as a non-EU member;

THE question of Norway's candidacy for EU accession will not go away. True, the present government has a 'suicide pact' to dissolve the ruling coalition should one of its parties raise the matter. But the success of the euro, the interest of Norway's business community, and growing awareness of the oddities of the present relationship are all keeping the issue on the boil.

The story is increasingly one of a systemic anachronism. Initially there was the nice idea that Norway could associate with those EU policies which it liked and keep out of others, and retain the national autonomy and independence that its people were very attached to. However things have not quite worked out that way. Norway actually sought to associate with virtually all the EU's new policy areas, but the terms of these associations lack political legitimacy.

A hard-headed look at what is actually happening to Norway on the European landscape suggests the following pattern across six major blocks of policy.

Guaranteed market access

The European Economic Area (EEA) gives Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein access to the EU market, but at the price of intrusive legislation and regulation that goes deep into domestic economic policy making.

The EU decides the policy and the EEA associates have to apply it. The EEA has a few institutional features of a club of equal members, but this is really political window dressing since it does not touch policy making.

The fish goes bad

Norway originally insisted on keeping fisheries out of the EEA, and this was one of the reasons for the 'no' votes in the referenda on EU membership in 1972 and 1994. However, since then, offshore cod supplies have dwindled, whereas coastal aquaculture has grown, with over-supply of salmon. Norway's salmon farmers have as a result faced protective EU measures (first anti-dumping duties, then minimum price provisions) as a clear cost of non-membership.

Monetary stability

International monetary regimes have increasingly polarised between inclusion in one of the (two) continental and international currencies or total monetary independence as a 'floater'.

The EU has accepted this logic and has gone the whole way with the euro. Norway has accepted the same logic, and gone the other way, which at least for the time being is reasonable: 'euroisation' without EU accession does not make sense economically or politically.

Freedom of access and security

Norway has secured freedom of movement and labour market access in Europe for its citizens through the combination of the EEA and Schengen.

This now leads on into the EU's expanding policies for internal security and justice and home affairs. However, the boundaries are not clear between 'Schengen-related' measures that would involve Norway, and 'non-Schengen-related' measures that might not. In the latter case, Norway has requested ad hoc association agreements (on asylum, the European arrest warrant, participation in Europol).

In these examples, the EU is the policy maker, while the associated states are policy takers.

Foreign policy

The EU is gradually pooling its foreign policy, and its national diplomacies share out the top jobs.

Norway's notable role in conflict-resolution diplomacy is thus beginning to suffer from some crowding out from the growing EU role, especially on the European periphery where the centripetal and systemic influences of the EU model are operative. This is a pity because of Norway's experience and finely tuned skills.

Defence

Old NATO is obsolete, or almost 'dead' to take a frank view. New NATO, which is a mechanism for security dialogue and crisis management, finds it now has company in Brussels with the EU.

The two are beginning to cooperate. Norway, as a non-EU NATO member, will find its position in the defence system becoming downgraded. It may associate with future ESDP actions, but again as a policy taker, not policy maker.

In all these domains, the EU member states have been, and still are, restructuring the nature of their sovereignty. Old national sovereignty is finished in the new Europe. The EU member states are achieving greater sovereignty from the synergy of putting the above six major functions together in a single political structure.

For those on the periphery the choice is becoming increasingly categorical, between 'in' or 'out'. The 'half-in' option still exists, but its nature is changing rapidly. 'Half-in' means being a policy taker, but not a policy maker.

Such a system can be made to work technically. It may even be a plausible 'half-way house' for the weak states of eastern Europe that aim at EU accession in the long-term.

The economics of such relationships may also be quite satisfactory. But it does not look politically sustainable for an ultra-advanced European democracy such as Norway.

• Michael Emerson is a senior research fellow for the Centre for European Studies; his co-author, Marius Vahl, is a research fellow for the same think-tank.

Article examines the pros and cons of Norway's status as a non-EU member.

http://www.ceps.eu/ http://www.ceps.eu/

---