|Author (Person)||Myers, Geoffrey|
|Publisher||The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)|
|Content Type||Blog & Commentary, Textbook | Monograph|
Access to the radio spectrum is vital for modern digital communication. It is an essential component for smartphone capabilities, the Cloud, the Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, and multiple other new technologies. Governments use spectrum auctions to decide which companies should use what parts of the radio spectrum. Successful auctions can fuel rapid innovation in products and services, unlock substantial economic benefits, build comparative advantage across all regions, and create billions of dollars of government revenues. Poor auction strategies can leave bandwidth unsold and delay innovation, sell national assets to firms too cheaply, or create uncompetitive markets with high mobile prices and patchy coverage that stifles economic growth. Corporate bidders regularly complain that auctions raise their costs, while government critics argue that insufficient revenues are raised. The cross-national record shows many examples of both highly successful auctions and miserable failures.
Drawing on experience from the UK and other countries, the author explains how to optimise the regulatory design of auctions, from initial planning to final implementation.
Table of Contents:
|Subject Categories||Business and Industry|
|Countries / Regions||Europe, United Kingdom|